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Face imagery is based on featural representations
Abstract
The effect of imagery on featural and configural face processing was investigated using blurred and
scrambled faces. By means of blurring, featural information is reduced; by scrambling a face into its
constituent parts configural information is lost. Twenty-four participants learned ten faces together with
the sound of a name. In following matching-to-sample tasks participants had to decide whether an
auditory presented name belonged to a visually presented scrambled or blurred face in two experimental
conditions. In the imagery condition, the name was presented prior to the visual stimulus and
participants were required to imagine the corresponding face as clearly and vividly as possible. In the
perception condition name and test face were presented simultaneously, thus no facilitation via mental
imagery was possible. Analyses of the hit values showed that in the imagery condition scrambled faces
were recognized significantly better than blurred faces whereas there was no such effect for the
perception condition. The results suggest that mental imagery activates featural representations more
than configural representations.
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Abstract 
ery and face 
ces. By means of 
to its 
nt ten faces 
(5 female, 5 male) were learned together with the sound of a name. In the imagery 
condition a name was presented and participants were required to imagine the 
r a blurred or 
bled or blurred 
on via mental 
imagery was possible. In both conditions participants had to decide whether the 
name belonged to the face or not. Analyses of the hit values showed that in the 
imagery condition scrambled faces were recognized significantly better than 
 such effect for the perception condition. The 
results suggest face imagery activates featural representations more than 
configural representations whereas both types of representations are of 
comparable importance in face perception. 
The role of featural and configural representations in face imag
perception was investigated using blurred and scrambled fa
blurring, featural information is hampered; by scrambling a face in
constituent parts configural information is lost. Prior to the experime
corresponding face as clearly and vividly as possible. Then, eithe
scrambled face was displayed. In the perception condition a scram
face and a name were presented simultaneously, thus no facilitati
blurred faces whereas there was no
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Introduction 
 a long time, but still 
yebrows 
 to say that it feels 
be shown around 
during the next class reunion. But what exactly is the difference? A striking distinction 
concerns the source that triggers a percept or a mental image. A percept has its origin in the 
 memorized 
pression of 
erception can 
teach me new things. In his work on the imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre puts it this way: “if I give 
myself in image the page of a book, I am in the attitude of the reader, I look at the printed 
lines. But I do not read. And, at the bottom, I am not even looking, because I already know 
1940, trans. 2004, p 10). Likewise, in the context of face imagery, I 
wi nown prior to 
 to decide 
whether it is really him or not. 
Despite these apparent differences various neuroimaging studies on mental imagery of 
s when the faces 
, & Ungerleider, 
I study, Ishai and colleagues (Ishai et al., 
2000) found content-related activation in extra-striate cortex and ventral temporal cortex 
when the participants visually imagined faces, houses, and chairs. It is noteworthy, however, 
that Ishai et al. (2000) also found some activity restricted to visual imagery in parietal and 
frontal cortex (see also Mechelli, Price, Friston, & Ishai, 2004).  
Imagine your history teacher back in your old schooldays. It may be
the teacher’s face can be imagined quite vividly. The pointed nose, the bushy e
behind those shell-rimmed glasses, the thin hair are unforgettable. Needless
different when we actually look at a photograph of this teacher as it may 
stimulus whereas a mental image is evoked internally, based on previously
information. Therefore, it has often been suggested that images never give an im
novelty, because we already know what we imagine. Other in perception: p
what is written” (Sartre, 
ll not have to undergo any recognition. The identity of the face is already k
the generation of the image. In contrast, when I see him on the street I will have
faces suggest that visual imagery evokes – at least partly - similar activation a
are in fact perceived (Farah, Peronnet, Gonon, & Giard, 1988; Ishai, Haxby
2002; Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000). In an fMR
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Further evidence that imagery and perception of faces underlie similar neural 
mechanisms comes from case studies with prosopagnosic patients, which revealed that an 
ntally visualize 
e Haan, 1994; 
ver, have described prosopagnosic patients 
with intact face imagery (e.g., Bodamer, 1947; Pallis, 1955). 
To further elicit the relation between imagery and perception of faces, Cabeza and 
colleagues (Cabeza, Burton, Kelly, & Akamatsu, 1997) conducted a priming study with 
ces and seen faces 
s. This led the 
ion, thus 
favouring a view that imagery and perception rely on partly distinct processes. However, it 
has to be noted that their perception and imagery conditions were not directly comparable. 
 test was used 
pearance of 
g effect between seen and imagined faces may therefore be a 
re ponse latencies 
because their design did not allow for any statement concerning accuracy. We will come back 
to this issue in the discussion section. 
d face perception 
l., 2002; Ishai et 
 perception and 
face imagery is not balanced; far more studies have investigated face perception. Many of 
these studies differentiate between processing of configural and featural face information 
(e.g., Bartlett, Searcy, & Abdi, 2003; Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; 
Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Schwaninger, Lobmaier, & Collishaw, 2002; Tanaka 
impairment of face recognition is often accompanied with the disability to me
faces (Charcot & Bernard, 1883; Young, Humphreys, Riddoch, Hellawell, & d
Young & Van De Wal, 1996). Some reports, howe
healthy participants. They found that imagined faces prime imagined fa
prime seen faces, but they found no priming between seen and imagined face
authors to the conclusion that imagery is not merely a weak form of percept
While they used a familiarity judgement as perception task, a speeded imagery
for the imagery task in which participants had to make judgements about the ap
celebrities. The missing primin
sult of task inconsistency. Moreover, Cabeza et al. (1997) only analysed res
Taken together, a wealth of knowledge suggests that face imagery an
involve partly the same neural mechanisms (e.g., Farah et al., 1988; Ishai et a
al., 2000). However, it has to be pointed out that the number of studies on face
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& Farah, 1993). Featural information is referred to the constituent elements of a face (i.e., 
eyes, nose, mouth) whereas configural information is understood as the spatial relationship 
d configural 
ett et al., 2003; 
 plays a 
dominant role in face perception (e.g., Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah 
et al., 1995; Farah et al., 1998; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). 
Assuming that perception and mental imagery indeed share some common mechanisms, 
nfigural and featural 
t al., 2002) 
 the whole of 
imagined faces. Specifically, they found increased activation in the right intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) when participants focussed on the features of the 
sses featural 
ominant role, at 
 Carey, 1986; Farah 
93), this need 
not necessarily be the case in mental imagery. People asked to imagine a familiar face most 
likely describe the face by the features and not by configural characteristics. Much more 
 teacher rather 
stance between his 
eyes. However, when asked to verbally describe a mental image, people are likely 
to characterize a visual mental image of a face as fuzzy or blurred, suggesting that people may 
not be able to activate in imagery precise representations of facial parts after all. Therefore, 
we designed this study to explore the representations people activate when they imagine a 
familiar face.  
between these parts. Many authors have provided evidence that featural an
information can be activated independently to recognise faces (e.g., Bartl
Schwaninger et al., 2002) and it has been suggested that configural information
we pursued the aim to investigate whether in mental imagery of faces co
information can be similarly dissociated. Indeed, Ishai and colleagues (Ishai e
found differential activation when participants attended to the features or
imagined face. This finding suggests that a separate neural mechanism proce
information. While in perception configural information seems to play a pred
least for familiar face recognition (e.g., Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Diamond &
et al., 1995; Farah et al., 1998; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 19
likely they would mention the bushy eyebrows and the thin hair of the history
than the configural characteristics, such as his inter-eye distance is ¾ the di
mouth and 
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Specifically, we investigate featural and configural representations in mental imagery 
and compare them to the role they play in perception. We ascertain the importance of 
ting face 
stituent parts of 
lurring a face the 
detail featural information contained in the parts is hampered. These manipulations enable 
independent investigation of featural and configural information. We ascertained whether a 
mental image of a face primes featural or configural information, or both. 
Twenty-four healthy participants (12 male / 12 female) ranging in age between 19 and 33 
years (mean 25 years) took part in this experiment. Four participants reported to be left 
handed and all had normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants gave informed 
consent and were either paid for their participation or received course credits. The participants 
were treated according to the Declaration of Helsinki (1991). 
The study was run on a 15.1” Pentium 4 portable Computer using Superlab Pro 2.0.2 running 
T. The experiment took place in a quiet, dimly lit room. The participants were 
seated in a height-adjustable chair at a distance of 500 mm which was maintained by a 
headrest.  They responded by using a Cedrus© Response Pad (RB-520). Each stimulus face 
appeared 95 mm wide and 125 mm high and thus subtended a visual angle of approximately 
9.5° horizontally. 
configural and featural representations in mental imagery and perception by tes
recognition by means of scrambled and blurred stimuli. By scrambling the con
a face, global configural information contained in the face is destroyed. By b
 
Method 
Participants 
Apparatus 
on Windows N
 7
Stimuli 
The stimuli were created from photographs of faces taken at the University of Zurich. The 
 All faces were 
il level. The intact 
g soft 
contours (5 pixel feather). Thus the outer features of the faces such as head shape and hair line 
were discarded and all the faces appeared at the same size and shape (296 pixels x 385 
names (e.g., Peter), which were presented 
ac  letters below 
rmation was discarded in 
the photographs. In a second step the faces were blurred using a Gaussian filter with a sigma 
of 0.025 of image width in frequency space, using the following equation exp(-f2 / 
(2 2 atures were 
ct stimuli. An 
yes, mouth 
and nose were cut out with the elliptic tool described above (eyes: 131 pixels x 95 pixels, 
mouth 160 x 82, nose 98 x 145 pixels). These features were placed on a grey background and 
scrambled in four different versions. Each version was arranged so that no part was situated in 
its natural relation to its neighbouring part. The scrambled features were placed within the 
same area as the intact and blurred stimuli, so they subtended to the same visual angle. An 
example of a scrambled stimulus can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
photographs were taken frontally and the faces were of a neutral expression.
scaled to a standard size of 300 pixels across the width of the face at pup
stimuli were cut out with an elliptic tool provided by Adobe Photoshop 7.0 usin
pixels). The target stimuli were given five letter 
oustically and visually during the study phase. The names were typed in bold
the face. Figure 1 shows an example of an intact stimulus. 
The blurred stimuli were created in two steps. First, colour info
*sigma )). Using the same elliptic tool as for the intact stimuli the outer fe
discarded. Thus the blurred stimuli were the same size and shape as the inta
example of a blurred stimulus is shown in Figure 1. 
Scrambled stimuli were created from the intact faces in following steps. E
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Task and Procedure 
The participants were given written and oral instructions. Prior to the experiment they 
rtened versions 
trials appeared 
ants learned 
the names of ten target faces. Each face was successively presented together with a name (e.g. 
“Peter”). The name was presented acoustically via headphones and visually in bold letters 
 its name so that 
ssible. Half of 
utton was 
 to hold on to the 
image. As soon as the mental image started to fade, participants pressed the button again and 
the face reappeared and participants could correct and consolidate their image. On another 
o seconds 
hases were 
 naming task 
ntly and the 
participants had to name each face. If participants did not name all faces correctly a further 
study session was accomplished, until all ten faces were named correctly. To further practice 
ice block). In this 
ame was 
 which the face 
was to be imagined. Participants were requested to visualize the appropriate face as vividly as 
possible and fit the image onto the grey array. When the image was generated participants 
pressed a button, what made a small dot appear within the oval shape. This dot was either at 
the exact location where eye, nose or mouth would appear or 1 cm lower or higher than the 
underwent a demonstration version of the experiment, which consisted of sho
of the blocks described below. None of the stimuli used in the demonstration 
in the experiment proper. The experiment started with a learning block. Particip
below the face. Participants were told to precisely memorize the face with
they can later form a mental image that matches the original as precisely as po
the target faces were female, the other half male. The face was visible until a b
pressed. Then the screen went blank during which the participants were told
button press the face disappeared anew and a fixation cross appearing for tw
signalized the appearance of the next target face. A minimum of two study p
carried out. To make sure that the participants learned the faces sufficiently, a
was carried out after the study phase. All target faces were presented subseque
mental imagery of faces another training block was included (imagery pract
block each trial started with a fixation cross appearing for 1 second. Then a n
presented via headphones together with an oval shape indicating the array in
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feature. The participants then had to decide whether or not this dot would appear on a facial 
feature (eyes, nose, mouth) of the imagined face. As the location of the dot was determined 
 visual image of each 
e dot, thus the 
ir answers. This feedback enabled the 
participants to correct their mental image if necessary. 
The experiment proper consisted of an imagery block (imagery condition) and a 
perception block (perception condition). The order of these blocks was counterbalanced 
practice block, 
ared for one second. 
corresponded to the face they imagined or not. In half of the trials the face and the name 
corresponded, in the other half name and face did not correspond. To control whether 
pa tice block were 
 the dot would 
 presented. 
 by a blurred or 
scrambled face. At the same time, a name was presented via headphones. The task was to 
decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the presented name belonged to the 
blurred or scrambled face. As i tion half of the trials were same and half 
were different. The experimental design is shown in Figure 1. After the experiment 
participants completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks, 1973). 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
individually for each face, the task required a highly accurate and vivid
face. After each answer the appropriate face appeared together with th
participants were given direct feedback on the
across participants. The imagery condition was comparable to the imagery 
except that instead of the red dot either a blurred or a scrambled face appe
In a yes/no decision task participants had to decide whether the scrambled or blurred face 
rticipants really mentally visualized the faces, ten tasks of the imagery prac
included at random intervals, and participants had to decide whether or not
appear on the location of the left or right eye, nose, or mouth, were it visually
In the perception condition a trial started with a fixation cross followed
n the imagery condi
 10
Results 
ry condition the 
he perception 
urred faces. The 
bled, blurred) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the hit rates revealed a significant effect of information 
(scrambled, blurred), F(1,23) = 19.005, MSE = 0.021, p < .001. There was no main effect of 
 0.017, p < .01. 
rom blurred trials in 
, T = 5.086, p < 
 blurred trials did not differ in the two conditions, but 
scrambled trials showed significantly higher hit rates in the imagery condition than in the 
perception condition, T = 2.693, p < .05. 
ted as outliers 
and were not included in the analyses. Thus, less than 1.8 % of the trials in the imagery 
condition were excluded and less than 1.9% of the trials were excluded in the perception 
gery condition the 
In the perception 
s for scrambled faces. A 2 x 
2 ANOVA of the RTs revealed no significant effects, neither for condition (imagery, 
perception), F(1,23) = 0.024, MSE = 120362, p = .878, nor for information (scrambled, 
blurred), F(1,23) = 0.03, MSE = 37546, p = .865. There was no interaction of condition x 
information. This finding suggests that there was no speed accuracy trade-off. 
Accuracy: The number of correctly matched faces was analysed. In the image
mean hit rate was 88.3% for scrambled faces and 67.9% for blurred faces. In t
condition the mean hit rate was 75.0% for scrambled faces and 69.6% for bl
mean hit rates are depicted in Figure 2. A 2 (imagery, perception) x 2 (scram
condition, but condition and information interacted, F(1,23) = 8.171, MSE =
Post-hoc t-tests (two-tailed) revealed that scrambled trials did not differ f
the perception condition, but differed significantly in the imagery condition
.001. Furthermore, the hit rates of
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
Reaction Times: Reaction times (RTs) that were 3000 ms or longer were trea
condition. Also, only RTs of correct answers were considered. In the ima
mean RT was 1762 ms for blurred faces and 1721 ms for scrambled faces. 
condition the mean RT was 1739 ms for blurred faces and 1766 m
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Control Condition: To ascertain whether participants were able to form a mental image of the 
test faces we calculated the d’ values of the control condition by subtracting the z-transformed 
 control condition 
e d’ values 
ants performed 
above chance level. The control condition was designed specifically to assess participants’ 
performance in accurately visualizing the faces.  
Questionnaires: The mean VVIQ scores ranged from 1.56 (clear and reasonably vivid image) 
is ‘perfectly clear 
ou only “know” that 
 d’ values of the 
control condition, r(24) = .293, p = .165, nor with the hit rates of the blurred imagery 
p = .875. But the VVIQ scores correlated with the hit rates of the 
er recognition rates 
for scrambled than for blurred faces. In the perception condition there was no difference 
between scrambled and blurred faces. This suggests that recognizing blurred and scrambled 
aces in the 
y primes featural 
sses are of comparable 
importance, mental imagery seems to activate featural more than configural representations. 
This assumption is further underlined by the correlation of the VVIQ scores and the hit rates 
of the scrambled imagery condition. The better the imagery abilities, as assessed with the 
VVIQ, the higher hit rates were for scrambled faces in the imagery condition. 
false alarm rates from the z-transformed hit rates. The mean d’ value in the
of the experiment was 0.84 (SEM = .35).  A one-sample t-test revealed that th
differed significantly from 0, T (23) = 2.413, p < .05, indicating that particip
to 3.31 (moderately clear and vivid image). Rating 1 indicated an image that 
and as vivid as normal vision’, and rating 5 indicated ‘no image at all, y
you are thinking of an object’. The VVIQ scores neither correlated with the
condition, r(24) = .034, 
scrambled imagery condition, r(24) = -.449, p < .05.  
Discussion 
The most important finding of this study was that face imagery led to high
faces was equally difficult. However, the advantage we found for scrambled f
imagery condition suggests that top-down activation of faces predominantl
representations. While in perception configural and featural proce
 12
Using introspection we may intuitively describe a mental image as blurred or fuzzy, as 
has accurately been described by Sartre in his important work The Imaginary (1940, trans. 
t the face “is 
red” (p. 17). 
etails of the face. 
In contrast to this phenomenological description our findings suggest that introspection may 
misguide us in the search of the true nature that underlies visual mental images. Scrambled 
faces were recognized more accurately than blurred faces, indicating that rather than a blurred 
agine a face. 
tially primes 
y condition with 
those from the perception condition. Insofar, in both the imagery condition and the perception 
condition participants had to match a name of a learned face with a presented face, albeit in 
wering. 
ondition, neither for the hit rates nor for the RTs 
su  interaction of 
te configural 
representations as much as featural representations. 
In contrast to Cabeza and colleagues (1997) we found that imagery can indeed prime 
 found higher 
on. Blurred faces, 
ce could be 
formed beforehand. Contrary to our study, Cabeza and colleagues did not differentiate 
between configural and featural representations. Had they included a task involving featural 
information, they might have found a priming effect of face imagery on face perception. 
Furthermore, their data analysis was restricted to response latencies. While the response times 
2004). While trying to remember the face of his friend Pierre, Sartre finds tha
very imperfectly attained: some details are lacking (…) the whole is rather blur
Only a photograph of Pierre can bring back to Sartre’s memory the featural d
image we in fact activate relatively detailed featural representations when we im
In this study we were interested whether a mental image of a face differen
configural and featural information and compared the results from the imager
the imagery condition they generated a mental image of the face before ans
Interestingly, there was no main effect of c
ggesting no overall facilitation through imagery. However, the significant
condition and information indicates that mental images of faces do not activa
recognition of faces. But imagery essentially primes featural information: We
accuracy for scrambled faces in the imagery than in the perception conditi
however, were recognized equally well, whether or not a visual image of the fa
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revealed no significant effects in the present study, response accuracy did. Finally, the tasks in 
the imagery and perception condition in Cabeza et al.’s study were inconsistent. In our study 
ng the mental image of the face, which 
wa
magery 
condition were correctly recognized. We therefore do not claim that imagery fails to activate 
configural representations, but argue that when asked to spontaneously form a visual image of 
a newly learnt face people tend to activate featural more than configural information. Had 
tivate configural representations of a face (e.g., 
wh gural 
The present results provide evidence that featural and configural processing can be 
differentiated in mental imagery. This goes along with findings revealed by means of 
and configural 
s of 
 in forming 
others report a 
disability to mentally visualize faces (e.g., Charcot & Bernard, 1883; Young et al. 1994). It 
may be possible that in the former group of patients the lesion affects only perception-driven 
wn activation of featural representations is 
sti eption-driven 
ill have to be the issue 
of future brain-imaging studies with patients suffering from prosopagnosia with or without 
impaired imagery abilities to substantiate this proposition. 
Another interesting issue is to discuss our findings against the background of studies on 
the verbal overshadowing effect. The term verbal overshadowing effect describes the 
the tasks were the same with the only difference bei
s generated before the face stimuli were visually presented. 
It has to be noted, however, that almost 70% of the blurred trials in the i
participants been asked to specifically ac
ose eyes are closer together, Peter’s or David’s) it is possible that confi
representations could play a more important role. 
neuroimaging (Ishai et al., 2002). Moreover, the difference between featural 
processing in face imagery may help to better understand inconsistent report
prosopagnosic patients. Some people with prosopagnosia report no difficulties
mental images of faces they know (e.g. Bodamer, 1947; Pallis, 1955), while 
activation of face representations while a top-do
ll possible. In the latter group, however, it is possible that top-down and perc
activation of face representations are equally affected by the lesion. It w
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phenomenon that people recognized faces less accurately when they previously described the 
face verbally (Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  
ing strategy (i.e., 
aces is impaired. 
gnition of 
faces, but the processing strategy adopted when describing a face. Describing a face verbally 
activates a local processing strategy, as faces are most often described by the features. Our 
findings suggest that, similar to verbal description, a mental image of a face will also activate 
or 
ns of eye 
nformation, it 
will be the features that come to mind when witnesses are asked to remember the face of the 
person they saw committing a crime. Photofit pictures used by the police meet these concerns, 
adowing effect 
ds to impaired recognition of the whole 
fa gs suggests that 
riptions of witnesses 
and their ability to recognise the offender in a later line-up. 
In conclusion, we found that although featural and configural processes can be 
ems to 
tations. While performance in configural and featural 
trials was comparable in the perception condition, the importance of featural information was 
higher in face imagery. This finding suggests that imagery of faces activates featural 
representations more accurately than configural representations. In perception configural and 
featural representations played an equal role. 
Macrae and Lewis (2002) found that when participants adopt a local process
pay more attention to featural information), recognition of newly learned f
Their finding suggests that not the verbal description per se hampers later reco
featural representations. These findings could therefore have practical implications f
criminal investigations when trying to find an offender based on the descriptio
witnesses. Because mental imagery of a face seems to mainly activate featural i
as the faces are built up from different face parts. However, the verbal oversh
suggests that an activation of the features later lea
ce. Taking the findings of Macrae and Lewis together with our findin
forensic psychologists have to be careful about the accuracy of the desc
separately activated in both mental imagery and perception, mental imagery se
particularly activate featural represen
 15
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Figure Captions 
 
Figu tudy phase, imagery and perception conditions. Italic 
words were presented acoustically.  
Figure 2: Mean d’ values for scrambled and blurred trials. Left panel = perception condition, 
right panel = imagery condition. Error bars depict standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
re 1: Examples of trials in the s
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